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 SUMMARY 
 
The aim of this treatise is to provide an analysis of the tax implications of making use of 
limited real rights in tax planning. 
 
In order to understand the tax implications of making use of limited real rights it is 
necessary to understand the nature and legal form of these rights.  The importance of 
this understanding lies in the determination of the tax legislation applicable to the right 
in question, and the subsequent tax implications. 
 
The next step in working through an analysis of the tax implications of making use of 
limited real rights is therefore to define the scope of applicable legislation.  This 
required an analysis of the scoping provisions of our tax legislation.  Once the scope of 
applicable legislation had been defined, it was then possible to move onto an analysis of 
the application of the legislation identified to the various “stages” of limited real rights.   
 
The conclusion from this analysis is that the tax implications of making use of limited 
real rights are spread fairly broadly across several different pieces of legislation, and 
need to be carefully and fully considered when making a decision to make use of 
limited real rights in a tax planning strategy. 
 
The conclusion on the analysis of certain selected tax planning strategies that make use 
of limited real rights is that it is possible to make fairly substantial cash flow savings 
when deciding to implement a particular strategy which makes use of limited real rights.  
 But, that use of these strategies is not without risk.  For example, SARS may examine a 
particular strategy in terms of the “new” GAAR.  The financial implications of the 
successful application of the GAAR may be disastrous to the taxpayer, and the tax 
planner will need to have considered and advised on the possibility of such a challenge 
from SARS.  In addition, in some of the strategies, there are risks associated with the 
anticipated life expectancy of parties to the tax plan being shorter than anticipated. The 
conclusion is that the use of limited real rights in tax planning can be effective and 
provide savings, but that the use of such a strategy requires, inter alia, a very careful 
consideration of the interaction and application of our tax legislation to the strategy. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The aim of this treatise is to provide an analysis of the tax implications of making use of 
limited real rights in tax planning. 
An interest in immovable property is a limited real right, that is a registered right which 
one person has over the property of another.1   
There are two categories of real rights, namely ownership and limited real rights.  A 
limited real right is a right which one person has over another person’s property.2  Such 
limited real rights include a usufruct, a fiduciary interest, a right of usus and a right of 
habitatio. 
A real right must be distinguished from a personal right, which is a right which confers 
upon its holder the capacity to claim something from another person.  Such personal 
rights include a right to income from a trust and the right to occupy trust property. 
This treatise will make an analysis of the tax implications of the use of limited real 
rights in tax planning.   
To critically analyse these rights requires a clear understanding of their nature and legal 
form.  Chapter two of this treatise therefore sets forth a summary of some of the salient 
aspects of the various rights under examination. 
                                                 
1 Ex Parte Geldenhuys, 1926 OPD 155; Registar of Deeds (Tvl) v The Ferreira Deep Ltd 1930 AD 169 
2 Ibid 
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Once an understanding of the nature and legal form of these rights is obtained, it is 
important, from the tax planning point of view, to understand the scope of applicable 
legislation to these rights.  Chapter three therefore defines the scope of South African 
legislation that will find application to these rights. 
Having set forth the scope of applicable legislation in chapter three, chapters four to six 
then examine the application of this legislation to various “stages” of these rights, 
including inter alia, the creation at the bequest of a testator, creation on sale and 
purchase, creation on donation, cessation during lifetime and time of death “stages”.  
The tax implications of the application of the legislation at each of these various 
“stages” is examined in detail. 
Finally, having obtained an understanding of the basic principles applicable at each of 
the various stages outlined in chapters four to six, an analysis is made in chapter seven 
of the various tax planning opportunities that the use of these rights present.   
The conclusion to the treatise is set forth in chapter eighth, and summarises the main 
findings and inferences contained in the treatise.   
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CHAPTER 2: LEGAL NATURE OF LIMITED REAL RIGHTS 
2.1 Introduction 
Before moving onto a consideration of which tax law is applicable to limited real rights 
and the implications of the application of these laws in the context of tax planning, it is 
necessary to discuss the legal nature of these rights.  
This understanding extends to an appreciation of how and when such rights are legally 
created and extinguished. 
2.2 Limited real rights 
An interest in immovable property is a limited real right, that is a registered right which 
one person has over the property of another.3   
There are two categories of real rights, namely ownership and limited real rights.  A 
limited real right is a right which one person has over another person’s property.4  Such 
limited real rights include a usufruct, a fiduciary interest, a right of usus and a right of 
habitatio. 
A real right must be distinguished from a personal right, which is a right which confers 
upon its holder the capacity to claim something from another person.  Such personal 
rights include a right to income from a trust and the right to occupy trust property.5 
                                                 
3 Ex Parte Geldenhuys, 1926 OPD 155; Registar of Deeds (Tvl) v The Ferreira Deep Ltd 1930 AD 169 
4 See cases cited in footnote 1 above 
5 CIR v Lazarus’ Estate 21 SATC 379  
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Delport notes that: 6  
“The distinction between personal and real rights is important.  A real right is 
enforceable against the whole world, that is, against the owner of the property and all 
other persons who have legal claims to the property by virtue of a contract with the 
owner or because of the death or insolvency of the owner.  A personal right, on the 
other hand, merely gives the holder the right to claim from a particular person either 
that he delivers a thing, or performs or refrains from performing a certain act.” 
Delport goes on to explain this distinction by way of the following example:7 
“Thus if the owner of (A) of a tract of land agrees with the owner (B) of another tract of 
land that A may have a right of way over B’s land, the right arising from the contract in 
favour of A is a personal right.  Should B sell the property to C, the latter would, in the 
absence of knowledge of the right of way, not be bound to recognise A’s right because 
he was not a party to the contract between A and B.  However, should A have registered 
his right against the title deed of B’s property, the right would on registration have 
become a real right.  As such, C would have had to honour A’s right of way if the 
property was alienated to him by B, since A’s real right would have been enforceable 
against B’s successors in title.” 
This is an important distinction to understand.  Before a right is considered to be a “real 
right” in the context of rights over immovable property, it must be registered against the 
                                                                                                                                               
 
6 H J Delport South African Property Practice and the Law- A Practical manual for Property 
Practitioners at page 7 
7 Delport at page 7 
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title deed.  The nature of the right also determines the availability of a suitable remedy 
in law. 
This treatise focuses on the following limited real rights; usufruct, a right of usus, a 
right of habitatio and a fiduciary interest. 
2.3 Servitudes 
The categories of usufruct, usus and habitatio fall into the broader category of limited 
real rights known as servitudes. 
“A servitude is a limited real right…which entitles its holder either to the use 
and enjoyment of another person’s property or to insist that that such person 
shall refrain from exercising certain entitlements flowing from his or her right of 
ownership over and in respect of his or her property which he or she would have 
if the servitude did not exist”8 
Roman-Dutch law recognises two general types of servitude, the praedial and the 
personal servitude.  The praedial servitude accrues to a person in his capacity as owner 
of a particular property whereas a personal servitude is a right in favour of a particular 
individual.9   
                                                 
8 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar and H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property at para 14.1. 
9 Lorentz v Melle 1978 (3) SA 1044 (T) 
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This treatise focuses, inter alia, on three personal servitudes, the usufruct, the usus and 
the habitatio.10  Before considering the nature of these three personal servitudes, we 
consider some of the key features of a personal servitude as noted by Delport:11 
“A personal servitude is not granted in perpetuity.  The servitude can be granted for a 
specific period; if no period is specified, it terminates on the death of the holder of the 
servitude.  A servitude granted to a legal person (such as a company) expires after 100 
years. 
Once acquired a personal servitude cannot be alienated or transferred to someone else.  
The servitude holder can, however, let or sell to another person the use and enjoyment 
of his servitude.  This person does not acquire a limited real right in the property, only 
a personal right against the servitude holder.  His right to make use of the servitude 
expires on the death of the holder of the servitude.” 
The personal servitude expires on the death of the personal servitude holder.  This is an 
important fact, the implications of which are examined in more detail in the chapters of 
this treatise which deal with the tax implications at the various “stages” of limited real 
rights.  In particular, the chapters dealing with the ceasing of these rights in the course 
of a persons lifetime, the bequest of these rights and the enjoying of a limited interest at 
the time of death. 
2.3.1 Usufruct, usus and habitatio 
                                                 
10 The terms “bare dominium” and “fideicommissum” and the tax implications thereof in the context of 
tax planning are also examined in this treatise, and are explained later on in this chapter. 
11 Delport at page 53. 
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Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert summarise the key features of each of the personal 
servitudes considered in this treatise as follows:12 
2.3.1.1 Usufruct 
“A usufruct may be defined as a real right in terms of which the owner of a thing (often 
referred to as the grantor) confers on the “usufructuary” the right to use and enjoy the 
thing to which the usufruct relates. The thing may be movable or immovable, whether 
corporeal or incorporeal… 
…As the usufructuary is only entitled to the use and enjoyment of the property he or she 
does not acquire the ownership over it, though he or she is of course entitled to its 
possession.  The usufructuary has no entitlement to consume and destroy the thing (ius 
abutendi) and is obliged to preserve its substance.  But he or she has the right to take, 
consume or alienate its fruits, whether they are natural, industrial or civil…   
…As the usufructuary is not the owner of the property that is the subject matter of his or 
her right, he or she cannot alienate or encumber it.  Nor may he or she alienate the real 
right of usufruct as a personal servitude is inseparably linked to its holder.  
However, he or she may deal with his or her interest in the property so that he or she 
may encumber the right of usufruct or even dispose of his the right to the use and 
enjoyment of the property and its fruits whether by sale, lease, loan or leave to hold at 
pleasure, provided that such arrangement does not exceed the period in respect of 
which the usufruct has been granted.” 
2.3.1.2 Usus 
                                                 
12 Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert para 14.12. 
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“A servitude of use resembles a usufruct, but the holder’s rights are far more restricted. 
He or she may possess and use the thing to which the right relates if it is a movable and 
occupy it together with his or her family and visitors if it relates to land.  The holder 
may take the fruits of the thing for his or her daily needs as well as for the daily needs 
of his or her household, but nothing in excess of that.  The holder cannot sell any fruits.  
Nor may he or she grant a lease in respect of a building, though this rule is subject to a 
number of exceptions…” 
2.3.1.3 Habitatio 
“The servitude of habitation confers on its holder the right to dwell in the house 
of another together with his or her family without detriment to the substance of 
the property.  Unlike the servitude of use, it carries with it the right to grant a 
lease or sublease to others” 
In addition to the points made on a usufruct above, Delport notes that should the 
servitude holder let or sell to another person the right to use and enjoyment of his 
servitude, that such other person acquires a personal right, and not a limited real right.13  
This means the right is only enforceable against the personal servitude holder. 
 
                                                 
13 Delport at page 53 
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2.3.2 Creation of servitudes 
Delport notes that servitudes are usually granted in pursuance of a contract between the 
owner of the servient property and the prospective holder of the servitude.14  However, a 
mere agreement whereby a servitude is granted is not sufficient to constitute the 
servitude.  To take effect the servitude must be registered against the title deed of the 
servient tenement.15 
A servitude can also be constituted by means of a reservation in a deed of transfer when 
property is transferred.16 
Delport explains this as follows:17 
“Thus if A sells his property to B, A can acquire a personal servitude over the property 
by having a clause inserted in the deed of transfer to the effect that the servitude is 
rendered in his favour.” 
In this treatise, the creation of these limited real rights is examined at the following 
three “stages”: 
• At the bequest of a testator, 
• On sale by the seller, and 
• On donation by the donor. 
 
                                                 
14 Delport at page 55 
15 Ibid 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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It is assumed in the discussion of each of these three stages, where reference is made to 
one of the above personal servitudes relating to immovable property, that the agreement 
conferring the servitude has been executed in the form of a notarial deed which has been 
registered in the deeds office. 
2.3.3 Termination of servitudes 
Servitudes may be extinguished, inter alia, in one of the following ways:18 
• Where the holder of the personal servitude becomes owner of the servient 
tenement.  In other words, where the personal servitude acquires full ownership 
of the property over which he holds the personal servitude. 
• Permanent impossibility to exercise the servitude.  The example given is where 
there is a holder of a right of habitatio and the house to which this right relates is 
destroyed. 
• Where the time frame for which the servitude is granted has lapsed. 
• On the death of the personal servitude holder. 
As for the creation of limited real rights, knowing when these limited real rights legally 
terminate is an important fact, the implications of which are examined in more detail in 
the chapters of this treatise which deal with the tax implications at the various “stages” 
of these limited real rights.  In particular, the chapters dealing with the ceasing of these 
                                                 
18 Delport at page 56 
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rights in the course of persons lifetime, the bequest of these rights and the enjoying of a 
limited interest at the time of death. 
What remains to be discussed in this chapter is the nature of a fiduciary interest.  To 
understand the meaning of fiduciary interest one needs to understand the terms “bare 
dominium” and “fideicommissum”. 
2.4 Bare Dominium 
The person who holds property which is subject to a usufruct is the holder of the bare 
dominium.  This means ownership without any other rights.19 
If the usufructuary dies (or where the usufruct is over a fixed period, the specified 
period of time elapses), the usufructuary rights accrue to the bare dominium holder who 
then becomes the full owner of the asset, unless it is provided that the usufructuary 
rights accrue to another usufructuary or a series of usufructuaries before reverting to the 
bare dominium holder.  
Upon the bare dominium holder’s death, his interests are transmissible to his 
testate/intestate heirs by normal succession, unlike a usufructuary interest which is not 
transmissible to heirs.20  
 
 
                                                 
19 K Huxam and P Haupt Notes on South African Income Tax page 535 
20 R King and B Victor Law and Estate Planning Easiguide chapter 17.2 
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2.5 Fideicommissum  
A fiduciary interest arises when a fideicommissum is created. A fideicommissum is 
created when a person transfers ownership in property to another person, the fiduciary, 
on the condition that the property will pass to a third person, the fideicommissary, on 
the happening of some event, usually the death of the fiduciary. 
A summary of some of the more important aspects in law relating to fideicommissum 
that are relevant to this treatise follows:21 
• “..In the case of a fideicommissum created by will it is not necessary for the 
fideicommissary to exist at the time of the death of the testator. What is crucial 
is that the fideicommissary must exist at the time the fideicommissary condition 
is fulfilled. 
• …It is possible to have single (simplex) and multiple (multiplex) fideicommissa. 
Thus the fideicommissum can end on the taking of the property by the 
fideicommissary or it can go to one or more successive fideicommissaries… 
• The fiduciary owns the property subject to the fideicommissum and is entitled to 
its use and enjoyment and the fruits thereof.  On the fulfilment of the 
fideicommissary condition the substance of the property must pass to the 
fideicommissary. This means that the fiduciary is generally prohibited from 
alienating the property or encumbering it with, for example, a mortgage or 
pledge. In the case of perishables the fiduciary can sell the property but must 
pass on the value thereof to the fideicommissary. Alienation is of course 
                                                 
21 Extract of salient points from summary in R King and B Victor Law and Estate Planning Easiguide 
chapter 2.3.2.2 
Page 13 of 83 
possible if it is a term of the fideicommissum or if the fideicommissary consents. 
The restriction on alienation applies only to the fideicommissary property and 
not to the fiduciary’s rights… 
• A fideicommissary enjoys a contingent right which becomes a vested right to 
the fideicommissary property on fulfilment of the fideicommissary condition. 
The contingent right is not transmissible to his/her deceased or insolvent estate. 
The fideicommissary has the right to enforce the terms of the fideicommissum 
and the right to recover the fideicommissary property if it has been alienated to 
a third party who is aware of the fideicommissum. 
• A fideicommissum differs from a trust in that a trustee only has an 
administrative interest in the trust property (unless he/she is also a beneficiary) 
whereas a fiduciary has a right of use and enjoyment of the property subject to 
the fideicommissum coupled with an obligation to preserve” 
2.6 Conclusion 
Before considering the application of various laws to the use of limited real rights as tax 
planning tools, it is important to understand the nature and legal form of these rights.  
This chapter has attempted to briefly outline the nature and legal form of each of the 
rights which will be examined in this treatise. 
This understanding creates the platform for an examination of the application of the tax 
law to these rights. 
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The next chapter examines which of the existing legislature in South African is of 
application to the rights which have been examined in this chapter.  Having defined the 
scope of applicable legislation, the remaining chapters in the treatise discuss the 
application thereof to various “stages” of these rights.  This includes an analysis of 
some of the tax planning strategies that utilise limited real rights.
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CHAPTER 3: ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATION APPLICABLE TO LIMITED 
REAL RIGHTS 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter of this treatise examined the nature and legal form of the various 
limited real rights which will be analysed in this treatise. 
This chapter defines the scope of the South African legislation relating to tax in South 
Africa, both direct and indirect, that will find application to the limited real rights that 
are being analysed. 
3.2 Estate Duty Act No 45 of 1955 (“Estate Duty Act”) 
In terms of the Estate Duty Act, an estate consists of all the property and deemed 
property of a person at the date of his death.  In terms of section 3(2)(a)&(b) of the 
Estate Duty Act, included in property is a: 
“Fiduciary, usufructuary or other like interest in property…..” 
The phrase “other like interest in property” has not yet been defined in this treatise and 
includes lesser limited interests such as usus, habitatio and grazing rights.22  Although 
personal rights are not the subject of this treatise, it is important to note that the phrase 
will include not only real rights, but also personal rights.23  Davis, Beneke and Jooste 
note that the phrase will include a right to income under a trust ceasing a death.24  These 
                                                 
22 Estate Watkins-Pitchford v CIR 1955 (2) SA 448 (A), 20 SATC 127. 
23 CIR v Lazarus’ Estate and Another 1958 (1) SA 311 (A), 21 SATC 379. 
24 DM Davis, C Beneke and RD Jooste Estate Planning para 2.3.2.2. 
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authors note that this will provide a powerful incentive to avoid vested rights to income 
of this sort (as the vested right will form part of property of the deceased estate). 
3.3 Income Tax Act no 58 of 1962 (“Income Tax Act”) 
3.3.1 Capital Gains Tax (“CGT”) 
The disposal of limited interests in immovable property will have CGT consequences.   
The definition of “asset” in paragraph 1 of the Eighth Schedule includes 
“…property of whatever nature, whether movable or immovable, corporeal or 
incorporeal…and a right or interest of whatever nature to or in such property” 
The South African Revenue Service has released, in draft form, a Comprehensive Guide 
to Capital Gains Tax.  This guide will be referred to in this treatise as the “CGT Guide”. 
Chapter four of the CGT Guide, in the section 4.1.2 which deals with the definition of 
asset for CGT purposes, states at 4.1.2.3 that:  
“According to LAWSA immovable things ‘are things which cannot be moved from one 
place to another without damage or change of form’. Examples: Land, buildings with 
foundations in the soil, trees, growing crops, real rights over immovable property (e.g. 
a usufruct or a lease longer than 10 years registered in the Deeds Office.)” [Author’s 
own emphasis in bold] 
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The CGT Guide notes that in terms of Roman-Dutch law, corporeal and incorporeal 
things can also be classified as movable or immovable and gives the following 
examples at 4.1.2.4: 
“Incorporeal movable property: Real rights over movable property, a usufruct over a 
movable asset, all personal rights. [Author’s emphasis] 
Incorporeal immovable property: Real rights over immovable property: a registered 
usufruct over immovable property, mineral rights, a registered praedial servitude and 
building restrictions.”[Author’s emphasis] 
An asset will therefore include limited real rights in immovable property such as a 
usufruct.  Although outside the scope of this treatise, it is of interest to note that per the 
CGT Guide, personal rights are included in the definition of “asset”.  For example, a 
right to income from a trust is a personal right and will be included in the definition of 
“asset”. 
3.3.2 Donations Tax 
A donation is defined in section 55(1) of the Income Tax Act as: 
“Any gratuitous disposal of property including any gratuitous waiver or 
renunciation of a right” 
Property in the definition of “donation” is defined as “any right in or to property 
movable or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal, wheresoever situated”.25 
                                                 
25 Section 55(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
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Property will therefore include limited real rights in immovable property.  It is 
submitted that personal rights will also be included in the definition of property, as the 
definition refers to “any right in or to property”.   Section 62(1)(a) of the Income Tax 
Act specifically deals with the valuation for donations tax purposes of any “…fiduciary, 
usufructuary or other like interest in property…”.  This same phrase is found in section 
3(2)(a) of the Estate Duty Act which states that property includes “…any fiduciary, 
usufructuary or other like interest in property…”.   The phrase “other like interest in 
property” is explained in 3.2 above, and includes personal rights in the context of Estate 
Duty.  It is submitted that the same interpretation will apply to donations tax. 
3.3.3 Transfer Pricing 
In terms of section 31(1) of the Income Tax Act, ‘Goods’ includes any corporeal 
movable thing, fixed property and any real right in any such thing or fixed property. 
“Goods” will therefore include limited interests in immovable property that are real 
rights.  The definition refers specifically to real rights and personal rights will therefore 
not be included in this definition. 
The consideration of transfer pricing implications to limited real rights is outside the 
scope of this treatise, but is included in this chapter for the sake of completeness of the 
consideration of applicable legislation. 
3.4 Value Added Tax Act No 89 of 1991 (“The VAT Act”) 
The VAT Act states in section one that goods means “corporeal movable things, fixed 
property and any real right in any such thing or fixed property…”.   
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As for the definition of goods in section 31 of the Income Tax Act, this definition will 
therefore include limited interests in immovable property that are real rights.  The 
definition refers specifically to real rights and personal rights will therefore not be 
included in this definition. 
In this regard, Kruger and de Koker state that:26 
“…the essential difference between a real right and a personal right is that the former 
is an assured benefit in a thing, whereas a personal right, or jus in personam, is a right 
entitling a person to claim from another some thing or act…Accordingly a 
fideicommissum or usufruct registered over fixed property falls within the definition of 
goods since these are real rights; but any rights in corporeal movable things or fixed 
property, which are not real rights, do not constitute goods”. 
This means that the personal rights are not goods as defined for purposes of the VAT 
Act. 
The application of the VAT Act to limited real rights is also deemed to be outside the 
scope this treatise. The VAT implications on the use of limited real rights will however 
need to be considered by the tax planner in making a decision to make use of limited 
real rights, and consideration of the application of the VAT Act is included for the sake 
of completeness. 
3.5 Transfer Duty Act No 40 of 1949 (“The Transfer Duty Act”) 
In terms of section two of the Transfer Duty Act, transfer duty shall be levied on the 
value of any property acquired by any person by way of a transaction or in any other 
                                                 
26 Ap de Koker and D Kruger VAT in South Africa at para 3.2 
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manner, or on the amount by which the value of any property is enhanced by the 
renunciation of an interest in or restriction upon the use or disposal of that property. 
Section one of the Transfer Duty Act defines property as follows: 
“Property” means land in the Republic and any fixtures thereon, and includes -  
(a) any real right in land but excluding any right under a mortgage bond or a lease of 
property other than a lease referred to in paragraph (b) or (c); 
(b) a lease or sub-lease of any lot or stand which is registrable in the office of the Rand 
Townships Registrar in terms of the Registration of Mining Rights Proclamation, 1902 
(Proclamation No. 35 of 1902, Transvaal) as read with section one of the Mining Titles 
Registration Act, 1908 (Act No. 29 of 1908, Transvaal); 
c) any right to minerals (including any right to mine for minerals) and a lease or sub-
lease of such a right; 
 
The term “any real right in land” will include a limited real right in land and limited real 
rights will therefore fall within the scope of the Transfer Duty Act.  
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has defined the scope of South African tax legislation applicable to the 
limited real rights which are being examined. 
It is clear that for the tax planner to make a decision on the use of limited real rights in a 
tax planning strategy will require the consideration of various pieces of legislation.  It is 
not possible to make a decision in this regard giving consideration to one piece of 
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legislation in isolation.  To do so would be to make a potentially costly mistake, as will 
be illustrated in chapter seven of this treatise. 
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CHAPTER 4: CREATION OF LIMITED REAL RIGHTS 
4.1 Introduction 
Within the framework of the legislation identified in chapter three, chapter’s four to six 
of this treatise analyse the tax implications of various “stages” of limited real rights.   
A limited real right can be created in several different ways, including: 
• At the bequest of a testator 
• On sale by the seller 
• On donation by the donor 
4.2 Creation of a limited real right at the bequest of a testator 
For purposes of the analysis of the applicable law, the following three categories of 
person will be examined: 
• The deceased, 
• The deceased estate, and 
• The heir or legatee 
4.2.1 CGT implications on creation of a limited real right at the bequest of a 
testator 
In terms of paragraph 40(1)27 a deceased person must be treated as having disposed of 
his assets to his deceased estate for proceeds equal to their market value on the date of 
his death.   
The following assets are not included in this deemed disposal:28 
 
                                                 
27 Paragraph 40(1) of the Eighth Schedule of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962. Hereafter, any 
reference to paragraph will be deemed to be to the Eighth Schedule, unless otherwise indicated. 
28 Paragraph 40(1) 
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“(a) assets transferred to the surviving spouse of that deceased person as contemplated 
in paragraph 67 (2) (a);…” 
In terms of paragraph 40(1) the deceased estate is treated as having acquired the assets 
from the deceased at a cost equal to market value, which cost must be treated as an 
amount of expenditure actually incurred and paid for the purposes of paragraph 
20(1)(a). 
In terms of paragraph 40(2), where an asset is disposed of by a deceased estate to an 
heir or legatee, the deceased estate is treated as having disposed of the asset for 
proceeds equal to the base cost in respect of that asset and the heir or legatee must be 
treated as having acquired that asset at a cost equal to the base cost of the deceased 
estate in respect of that asset.  This cost is treated as an amount of expenditure actually 
incurred and paid for the purpose of paragraph 20(1)(a). 
The application of the above sets of “rules” would appear to be relatively simple.  But 
an analysis of the following example, together with a summary from various authors on 
issues around valuing limited rights in this instance, illustrates that there are several 
areas which require clarification in such application. The following example is 
reproduced from the CGT Guide: 29 
“Facts: John Brown dies and bequeaths his holiday home to his family trust subject to a 
usufruct in favour of his spouse over her remaining life. His spouse has a life 
expectancy of 10 years. The base cost of the property in John’s hands is R400 000 and 
the market value of the property at date of death is R1 000 000. 
                                                 
29 CGT Guide, chapter 24 page 499 
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After 10 years John’s wife passes away. The trust thereafter disposes of the property for 
R1 000 000.  What are the CGT implications for: 
• John, 
• John’s deceased estate, 
• John’s wife, and 
• The John Brown Family Trust? 
Result: 
John (the deceased) 
The property is allocated between its component parts as follows: 
 
Market Value 1 000 000 
Usufruct (R1m x 12 % x 5.650) 678 000 
Bare dominium 322 000 
 
There will be a deemed disposal of the bare dominium in John’s hands at market value 
at date of death in terms of para 40(1). Since the usufruct has been left to his spouse 
there is a roll-over in respect of that asset in terms of para 40(1)(a) read with para 
67(2)(a).  
The capital gain on disposal of the bare dominium will be as follows: 
Proceeds 322 000 
Base cost  
(R400 000 x 322 000/1 000 000) 
128 800 
Capital Gain 193 200 
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Note that the base cost is apportioned in terms of the part-disposal rule in para 33. 
John will be entitled to the enhanced R50 000 30 annual exclusion in terms of para 5(2). 
 
John’s deceased estate 
In terms of para 40(1) John’s deceased estate will acquire the bare dominium at market 
value of R322 000. In terms of para 40(2)(b) the heir (in this case the trust) will in turn 
acquire the bare dominium at the market value to the deceased estate (R322 000). 
There is therefore no gain or loss in the hands of the deceased estate.  
 
John’s spouse (the usufructuary) 
John’s spouse (the usufructuary) acquires the usufruct at a rolled-over base cost of 
R271 200 (R400 000 – 128 800).  
(Author’s note: this portion of the example has been shortened to deal only with the 
base cost at death of deceased) 
The John Brown Family Trust (the bare dominium holder) 
The base cost of the property in the hands of the trust is R322 000 - the market value of 
the bare dominium at date of death.” 
 
Changing these facts slightly:  Had John left the usufruct to his girlfriend (not a spouse 
as defined in section 1 of the Income Tax Act), as opposed to his spouse, then paragraph 
40(1)(a) would not have been applicable and the usufruct would not have been excluded 
from the deemed disposal to the deceased estate.  What is received by the deceased 
estate is full ownership in the property.  The property is only “split” into limited real 
                                                 
30 Note that the amount applicable to the tax year end 29 February 2008 is R120 000. 
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rights subsequent to death. What is the impact of this change in facts on the application 
of paragraph 40? 
 
Davis, Beneke and Jooste state a possible problem in this instance as:31 
“What does, however, create difficulty is the application of paragraph 40(2). In other 
words, difficulty is experienced in determining, for base cost purposes, at what cost X 
and Y are deemed to have acquired their usufruct and bare dominium respectively. 
(Author’s note: the example discussed by Davis, Beneke and Jooste assumes the 
deceased owned a block of flats at the date of death and bequeaths the usufruct 
thereof to X and the bare dominium to Y.) 
“The difficulty arises because the deceased, in bequeathing the usufruct and bare 
dominium, is not bequeathing the asset referred to in paragraph 40(2), which is the 
asset which the deceased is deemed in terms of paragraph 40(1) to have disposed of to 
the deceased estate, namely, full ownership of the block of flats. The assets bequeathed 
are the usufruct and bare dominium in that block. Therefore, on a strict reading of 
paragraph 40(2) on its own, it is submitted that paragraph 40(2) has no application in 
this situation and X and Y are to be treated as having acquired their assets at no cost.” 
The CGT Guide example, on the original set of facts, does not create this problem, the 
asset received by the deceased estate is the bare dominium only, as in terms of the 
application of paragraph 40(1)(a), the usufruct is excluded from the deemed disposal.  
The base cost to the deceased estate is therefore the base cost to the heir/legatee.  The 
CGT Guide does not deal with the complication raised by Davis, Beneke and Jooste. 
                                                 
31 DM Davis, C Beneke and RD Jooste Estate Planning para 12.7.3. 
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Should the view of Davis, Beneke and Jooste be correct, then the impact of substituting 
John’s spouse with his girlfriend would result in their being a base cost of nil for both 
the usufruct and the bare dominium in the hands of the girlfriend and the trust 
respectively.  The view being that what is received by the estate is full ownership, and 
not the limited real rights of usufruct and bare dominium.  As these assets have not been 
received by the estate, there can be no base cost in terms of paragraph 40(1) and 
accordingly no base cost to the heir or legatee in terms of paragraph 40(2). 
What would the impact be to the deceased estate? The deceased estate is deemed to 
have disposed of the asset for proceeds equal to the base cost of the deceased estate in 
respect of that asset.  Applying the view of Davis, Beneke and Jooste, the proceeds in 
this instance would be nil, as the bare dominium and usufruct have no base cost, not 
being assets that formed part of the deceased’s property at death. 
Davis, Beneke and Jooste go on to state that: 
“It is of note that X and Y are not connected persons in relation to the deceased estate 
and accordingly paragraph 38(1) has no application.  Accordingly an acquisition cost 
cannot be deemed via paragraph 38(1).” 
This statement would find equal application to the example in the CGT Guide, it is the 
relationship between the deceased estate and the heirs/legatees that is under scrutiny in 
terms of paragraph 38, and not the relationship between John and the heirs/legatees.   
Finally, Davis, Beneke and Jooste note that: 
“It is unclear whether paragraph 33(1) of the Eighth Schedule, which is headed “Part-
disposals” applies in these circumstances. Paragraph 33(1) provides that 
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“…where part of an asset is disposed of, the proportion of the base cost 
attributable to that part disposed of is an amount which bears to the base cost of 
the entire asset the same proportion as the market value of the part disposed of 
bears to the market value of the entire asset immediately prior to the disposal”.  
Paragraph 33 appears to be aimed at the disposal of ownership of part of an asset and 
the retention of ownership of the other part, for example, where a person purchases a 
piece of land and then sells part of it. It is doubtful whether the legislature envisaged 
paragraph 33 applying to the splitting of ownership into limited interests. An indication 
that it is not applicable to such a split in a deceased’s will is that paragraph 33(1) 
requires the market value immediately prior to disposal to be taken into account in 
doing the required apportionment. Paragraph 40(2), on the other hand, clearly requires 
the market value at the date of death, and not the date of disposal, to be taken into 
account in determining the base cost of the heirs and legatees. 
If paragraph 33(1) is applicable it appears that values would have to be placed on the 
usufruct and the bare dominium and the market value (either at the date of death or the 
date of distribution – this is not clear) of the asset would have to be apportioned 
between the usufruct and the bare dominium in the ratio that the values of the usufruct 
and the bare dominium respectively bear to the market value…” 
(Authors note: An assumption is made that paragraph 31 will apply in this 
instance.)  
After raising the problem of a potential nil value of the base costs of the usufruct and 
bare dominium in this instance, and questioning whether the paragraph 33 part disposal 
rules would find application, Davis, Beneke and Jooste would then seem to go on to 
accept that paragraph 33 may find application. 
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It is submitted that paragraph 33 will find application in this instance. The deemed 
disposal to the deceased estate would be at the market value of the holiday home, the 
base cost of which is the base cost of the full ownership to John.  The base cost to the 
heirs would be determined in accordance with paragraph 40(2)(b) by applying the 
apportionment of this base cost (of full ownership to the deceased estate) in terms of 
paragraph 33, read with paragraph 31(1)(d) and (e). 
Applying this solution to the facts of John and his deceased estate and heirs, assuming 
that John had bequeathed the usufruct to his girlfriend: 
Result for John: 
There will be a deemed disposal of the full ownership in the holiday home at market 
value at date of death in terms of paragraph 40(1). As the usufruct is not left to the 
spouse, there is no exclusion from the deemed disposal of the usufruct in terms of 
paragraph 40(1)(a).  
The capital gain on disposal will be calculated as follows: 
Proceeds 1 000 000 
Base cost   400 000 
Capital Gain   600 000 
Result for Johns Deceased Estate: 
In terms of paragraph 40(1) John’s deceased estate will acquire the holiday home at the 
market value of R1 000 000.  In terms of paragraph 40(2)(a), where an asset is disposed 
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of to an heir or legatee, the deceased estate must be treated as having disposed of the 
asset for proceeds equal to the base cost of the deceased estate in respect of that asset.  It 
is submitted that these proceeds will be R1 000 000 in this instance.  The deceased 
estate is disposing of the asset received from the deceased in parts, the usufruct and bare 
dominium.  The combined market value of these parts will be R1 000 000.  This will 
result in no gain or loss to the deceased estate.  To determine the split of this 
R1 000 000 to the usufruct and bare dominium requires the application of paragraph 33.  
This is discussed below. 
Result for John’s Girlfriend: 
It is submitted that John’s girlfriend will acquire the usufruct at a base cost determined 
in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 33. 
Paragraph 33 deals with the rules to be applied when part of an asset is disposed of.  It is 
submitted that the deceased estate is in fact, disposing of parts of an asset, in this 
instance, the holiday home. 
 
The base cost of the ‘part disposal’ would be calculable in terms of the formula in 
paragraph 33(1): 
Market value of part disposed of x Expenditure ito para 20 or MV ito para 29(4) 
Market value of entire asset immediately prior to disposal 
Assuming that the girlfriend has the same life expectancy as the replaced spouse, that is, 
10 years, the usufruct market value would be determined in accordance with the 
provision of paragraph 31(1)(d) which state: 
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“1)  The market value of an asset on a specified date is in the case of— 
(d) a fiduciary, usufructuary or other similar interest in any asset, an amount 
determined by capitalising at 12 per cent the annual value of the right of enjoyment of 
the asset subject to that fiduciary, usufructuary or other like interest, as determined in 
terms of subparagraph (2), over the expectation of life of the person to whom that 
interest was granted, or if that right of enjoyment is to be held for a lesser period than 
the life of that person, over that lesser period; 
(2)  For purposes of subparagraph (1) (d)— 
(a) the annual value of the right of enjoyment of any asset which is subject to any 
fiduciary, usufructuary or other like interest, means an amount equal to 12 per cent of 
the market value of the full ownership of the asset: …and 
(b) the expectation of life of a person to whom an interest was granted— 
(i) in the case of a natural person, must be determined in accordance with the 
provisions applicable in determining the expectation of life of a person for estate duty 
purposes, as contemplated in the regulations issued in terms of section 29 of the Estate 
Duty Act, 1955, (Act No. 45 of 1955); and 
(ii) in the case of a person other than a natural person, is a period of fifty years” 
The market value of the usufruct would therefore be the market value of the holiday 
home of R1 000 000 X 12% X 5.650 (per life expectancy tables).32  
The bare dominium would be valued in terms of paragraph 31(1)(e) as follows: 
                                                 
32 Present value factor for 10 years per life expectancy tables in Government Notice No.1942 of 23 
September 1977 
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(e)  any asset which is subject to a fiduciary, usufructuary or other similar interest in 
favour of any person, the amount by which the market value of the full ownership of that 
asset exceeds the value of that fiduciary, usufructuary or other like interest determined 
in accordance with item (d); 
Applying the above values to the formula per paragraph 33(1): 
Market Value of part disposed of: R678 000 X Expenditure ito para 20 of: R1 000 000 
Market value of entire asset of: R1 000 000 
The base cost of the usufruct disposed of is R678 000.  The bare dominium will make 
up the balance, and will have a base cost of R322 000. 
A similar problem to that encountered with the bequest of a usufruct and bare dominium 
is created with the bequest of a fideicommissum.  Davis, Beneke and Jooste describe 
this problem:33 
“So far the application of paragraph 40(2) to the bequest of a usufruct and bare 
dominium in an asset has been discussed. It is submitted that similar difficulties present 
themselves when the deceased creates a fideicommissum in his will; for example, he/she 
bequeaths ownership of an asset to X for X’s life and when X dies it is to pass to Y. X is 
acquiring a fiduciary interest in the asset.  
For the purposes of paragraph 40(2), X is not acquiring the asset referred to in 
paragraph 40(1). X is acquiring a different asset, a limited interest like a usufruct. It is 
to be noted that paragraph 31(1)(d) equates a fiduciary interest with a usufruct  which 
indicates that the same difficulties pertaining to the application of paragraph 40(2) to a 
bequest of a usufruct, discussed above, apply equally to a bequest of a fiduciary 
                                                 
33 DM Davis, C Beneke and RD Jooste Estate Planning para 12.7.3   
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interest. If this is the case, it may well be that X will be treated, for base cost purposes, 
as having acquired the fiduciary interest at no cost. The anomaly then arises that if 
there had been no fideicommissum but X had simply been bequeathed the asset, X 
would have a base cost of the market value referred to in paragraph 40(1), whereas if X 
only receives a fiduciary interest, X will have no base cost even though the 
fideicommissum could fall away soon afterwards if Y predeceases X.” 
 
It is submitted that the base cost of the fideicommissum to the heir or legatee will be 
valued by the application of paragraph 33 read with paragraph 31(1)(d), as is suggested 
for the valuation of the base cost of the usufruct and bare dominium to the heir or 
legatee earlier in this chapter. 
 
4.2.2 Estate Duty implications on the creation of a limited real right at the bequest 
of a testator 
The Estate Duty Act states at section 3(2) that “property” means “any right in or to 
property”.  Applying the Estate Duty Act to the facts of the example discussed in the 
capital gains section above:  The holiday home is “property” as defined and will be 
included in John’s estate in terms of section 3(2) of the Estate Duty Act.. 
 
However, section 3 of the Estate Duty Act is not read in isolation. Section 4 of the 
Estate Duty Act states that the net value of an estate will be determined by making 
certain deductions from the total property included therein in accordance with section 3 
of the Estate Duty Act. 
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One of the deductions in section 4 of the Estate Duty Act relates to property that accrues 
to the surviving spouse of the deceased.  In terms of section 4(q) of the Estate Duty Act, 
the value of such property is to be deducted from the value of the property included 
therein in terms of section 3 of the Estate Duty Act. 
 
Section 5 of the Estate Duty Act provides rules for the valuation of “property”.  Section 
5(1)(g) of the Estate Duty Act applies to property which is not sold in the course of 
winding up the estate and is not a limited or partial right in property.  The value of such 
a property is the “fair market value”. 
 
Fair market value is defined in section 1 of the Estate Duty Act as: 
“fair market value”, means— 
(a) the price which could be obtained upon a sale of the property between a willing 
buyer and a willing seller dealing at arm’s length in an open market; or 
(b) in relation to immovable property on which a bona fide farming undertaking is 
being carried on in the Republic, the amount determined by reducing the price which 
could be obtained upon a sale of the property between a willing buyer and a willing 
seller dealing at arm’s length in an open market by 30 per cent” 
 
Section 5(1)(b) of the Estate Duty Act deals with the valuation of a “fiduciary, 
usufructuary or other like interest” for purposes of section 3 and 4 of the Estate Duty 
Act.  The valuation of such property is dealt with in more detail in the chapter on 
“limited interests held at the time of death”.34  Essentially, the value of the usufruct is 
determined by capitalizing at twelve per cent the annual value of the right of enjoyment 
of the property over the expectation of life of the person to whom it vests, or if such 
                                                 
34 Refer to chapter six 
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right of enjoyment is to be held for a lesser period than the life of such person, over 
such lesser period. 
 
Applying these principles to the example on the original facts, that is, the usufruct is left 
to the surviving spouse of John:   
 
The value of full ownership in the holiday home will be included in the deceased estate 
in terms of section 3 of the Estate Duty Act.  The value of the usufruct left to the wife 
will be deducted from this value in terms of section 4(q) of the Estate Duty Act.  These 
values will be determined in accordance with section 5(1)(g) and 5(1)(b) of the Estate 
Duty Act accordingly. 
Net Value of Estate 
Property in terms of section 3 
(valued at market value ito section 5(1)(g) 
1 000 000 
Section 4(q) deduction 
(R1m X 12% X 5.650) 
Valued in terms of section 5(1)(b) 
(678 000) 
Net value of estate 322 000 
 
Assuming the same change in facts as for the capital gains section of this chapter, i.e. 
that John bequeaths the usufruct to his girlfriend and not to his spouse: 
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There will be no section 4(q) deduction, as this deduction is available only to the 
surviving spouse of the deceased.  The full market value of the property of R1 000 000 
will be included in John’s deceased estate. 
 
4.3. Sale and purchase of limited real rights 
4.3.1 CGT implications on the sale and purchase of a limited real right 
As discussed in chapter three, in terms of paragraph 1, an ‘asset’ includes ‘property of 
whatever nature, whether movable or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal…’ and ‘a 
right or interest of whatever nature to or in such property’. 
 
It is clear that limited real rights and personal rights will be included in this definition. 
 
A capital gain or a capital loss is made when proceeds or deemed proceeds arise on the 
disposal of an asset.35 
 
A disposal arises when there is any event, act, forbearance or operation of law that 
results in the creation, variation, transfer or extinction of an asset.36 
 
In the context of limited real rights, Stein notes that, for example, when a person grants 
a servitude over his property he would be creating an asset for the acquirer and this 
would amount to a part disposal of the property.37 
 
                                                 
35 Paragraph 3 and 4 of the Eighth Schedule 
36 Paragraph 11 of the Eighth Schedule 
37 M Stein Capital Gains Tax at 4.1 
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4.3.1.1 CGT Implications to the seller of a limited real right 
There are several scenarios that may be discussed in terms of the implications to the 
seller on the disposal of a limited real right or personal right.  We limit the discussion to 
the following scenarios: 
 
• Disposal of use 
• Disposal of a usufruct 
• Disposal of a bare dominium 
 
4.3.1.1.1 Disposal of use 
When part of an asset is disposed of it is necessary to allocate part of the base cost of 
the asset to the part disposed of in order to determine the capital gain or loss in respect 
of that part.  Paragraph 33 contains rules that determine the base cost attributable to the 
part disposed of, and prevent the allocation of a portion of the base cost in the case of 
certain part-disposals. 
 
The ‘right of use’ is an asset as defined in paragraph 1.  Contracting to grant this ‘right 
of use’ to another party is a disposal in terms of paragraph 11.  Paragraph 11(1)(a) 
specifically includes ‘the sale, donation, expropriation, conversion, grant, cession, 
exchange or any other alienation or transfer of ownership of an asset’. 
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Generally speaking, such a contract would be in the form of a lease arrangement.  The 
receipt or accrual from these arrangements will generally fall into gross income, and 
accordingly, there would be no ‘proceeds’ on the sale.   
 
The base cost of the ‘part disposal’ would be calculable in terms of the formula in 
paragraph 33. 
 
Market value of part disposed of x Expenditure ito paragraph 20 or MV ito paragraph 29(4) 
Market value of entire asset immediately prior to disposal 
 
The remainder of the expenditure or market value in terms of paragraph 29(4) would be 
allowable on a future disposal of the part retained. 
 
This would mean that ‘right of use’ disposed of would have a base cost with no 
proceeds received on disposal, thus creating a capital loss.  To prevent this capital loss, 
paragraph 33(3)(b) deems the ‘granting, variation or cession of a right of use or 
occupation of an asset without the receipt or accrual of any proceeds’ to be an event not 
treated as a part disposal.  Note that the base cost of the asset therefore remains the full 
original base cost, and is not reduced by this disposal, as it would have been had the 
disposal not been deemed a non-disposal in terms of paragraph 33(3)(b). 
 
4.3.1.1.2 Disposal of a usufruct 
In terms of the CGT Guide, the word ‘use’ must be distinguished from a usufruct.  A 
personal right of usus (right of use) is a lesser right than a usufruct.  It entitles the holder 
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to use the asset but not to appropriate its fruits.38  The disposal of a usufruct does not 
fall into the events not treated as part disposals in paragraph 33(3)(b), as this paragraph 
only excludes “right of use”, not usufruct. 
 
This would mean that in the instance where the receipt or accrual on disposal of the 
usufruct is included in gross income, there will be nil proceeds and a base cost 
calculated in terms of the paragraph 33(1) formula. A capital loss will therefore arise 
but this loss will probably be disregarded.  The seller cannot claim the capital loss to the 
extent that he used the property for non-trade purposes (paragraph15(c) read with 
paragraph 53(3)(f)). The capital loss is completely disregarded in this instance and can 
never be utilised. 
 
In the instance where the usufruct is disposed of for a limited period and the bare 
dominium holder ultimately reverts back to full ownership of the property, it is the base 
cost of the bare dominium which will be used should the property be sold once the 
usufruct has expired.39 In other words, it is the residue of the base cost after the 
apportionment of part of the base cost to the part disposal that is used to determine the 
capital gain or loss on disposal once the usufruct has expired. 
i.e. Future capital gain/loss on disposal = Original base cost – Apportioned base cost of 
part disposal (i.e. usufruct value). 
 
 
                                                 
38 CGT Guide page 210 
39 CGT Guide, at 8.27.5 page 209 
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4.3.1.1.3 Disposal of bare dominium 
The CGT implications to the seller on the disposal of the bare dominium are determined 
in accordance with the principles outlined in 4.3.1.1.1 and 4.3.1.1.2 above.  The sale of 
the bare dominium will be treated as a part disposal in terms of paragraph 33 and the 
base cost will be determined in accordance with the formula discussed in 4.3.1.1.1 
above. 
 
4.3.1.2 CGT implications to the purchaser of a limited real right 
The base cost for the purchaser of a limited real right will be the qualifying expenditure 
incurred in terms of paragraph 20(1)(a) – (c).  Assuming a post 1 October 2001 
acquisition, this will be the cost of acquisition to the purchaser.40 
 
4.4. Donations of limited real rights 
The tax implications in relation to fiduciary, usufructory and like interest will first be 
dealt with in full and thereafter the tax implications in relation to bare dominium. 
 
4.4.1 Donations tax implication on donation of fiduciary, usufructory or like 
interests 
In terms of section 62(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act, fiduciary, usufructuary or like 
interests in property are valued by capitalising at 12%, the annual value of the right of 
enjoyment of the property over which the interest was held, to the extent to which the 
donee becomes entitled to that right of enjoyment, over the life expectancy of the donor, 
or a lesser period if the interest is to be held by the donee for this lesser period. 
                                                 
40 Note that a discussion of the impact to the seller or purchaser of limited real rights relating to assets 
acquired pre October 2001 is considered to be outside the scope of this treatise. 
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Section 62(2) of the Income Tax Act states that the annual value of the right of 
enjoyment of a property is defined for this purpose as an amount equal to 12% of the 
value of full ownership of the property (fair market value) subject to the fiduciary, 
usufructuary or other like interest provided that where the Commissioner is satisfied that 
the property which is subject to any such interest could not reasonably be expected to 
produce an annual yield equal to 12 per cent on such value of the property, the 
Commissioner may fix such sum as representing the annual yield as may seem to him to 
be reasonable.  The Commissioner may do so on his own initiative, or upon request by 
the donor. 
 
4.4.2 Capital Gains Tax on donation of fiduciary, usufructuary or like interests 
The donation of an asset is generally a disposal for CGT purposes.41 The proceeds are 
deemed to be the market value of the asset at the date of disposal.42  The donee is 
deemed to have acquired the asset at market value for base cost purposes.43 On donation 
of a limited interest and determining the market value thereof, the provisions of 
paragraph 31 of the Eighth Schedule state as follows: 
“31.Market value.—(1) the market value of - 
…..(d) a fiduciary, usufructuary or other similar interest in any asset, an 
amount determined by capitalising at 12 per cent the annual value 
of the right of enjoyment of the asset subject to that fiduciary, 
usufructuary or other like interest, as determined in terms of 
                                                 
41 Paragraph 11(a) 
42 Paragraph 38(1) 
43 Paragraph 38(1)(b) 
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subparagraph (2), over the expectation of life of the person to 
whom that interest was granted, or if that right of enjoyment is to 
be held for a lesser period than the life of that person, over that 
lesser period;…” 
The difference in the market value so determined and the donor’s base cost will result in 
either a capital gain or a capital loss.   
 
To determine the base cost of the disposal of the limited interest will require the 
application of paragraph 33 of the Eighth schedule.44   
The donor would also be entitled to add the donations tax payable to the base cost of the 
asset in accordance with paragraph 20(1)(c)(vii).  This paragraphs states that the 
donations tax to be added to the base cost is to be determined in accordance with 
paragraph 22. 
Paragraph 22 states that  the amount of the donations tax payable by a person in respect 
of the disposal of an asset which may be taken into account in terms of paragraph 
20 (1) (c) (vii) must be determined in accordance with the formula -  
  
where— 
(a) “Y” represents the amount to be determined; 
                                                 
44 This formula is detailed earlier in this chapter, in 4.3.1.1.1.  The assumption for this part of the 
discussion is that the donor had initially purchased full ownership of the asset and has now donated a 
limited interest in such asset. 
Page 43 of 83 
(b) “M” represents the market value of the asset donated in respect of which the 
donations tax is payable; 
(c) “A” represents all amounts allowed to be taken into account in determining 
the base cost of the asset in terms of this Part (other than 
paragraph 20 (1) (c) (vii)); and 
(d) “D” represents the total amount of donations tax so payable: 
Provided that where the amount included in “A” is greater than the amount included in 
“M”, the amount of donations tax to be taken into account in terms of 
paragraph 20 (1) (c) (vii) shall be nil. 
An example which deals with the application of the above principles is covered in 
chapter seven.45 
4.4.3 Estate duty implications of donation of fiduciary, usufructuary or like 
interests 
The implications to both the donor and donee from an estate planning point of view will 
need to be considered when making a donation of a limited interest.  Specific examples 
which consider this impact are examined in chapter seven. 
4.4.4 Donation of the bare dominium 
In terms of section 62(1)(c) of the Income Tax Act, the right of ownership in movable 
or immovable property which is subject to a usufructuary or other like interest, is valued 
as the excess of the fair market value of the property over the value of the interest 
concerned. The value of the interest is determined in the following manner: 
                                                 
45 Refer to the example in chapter seven on split donations. 
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In the case of a usufructuary interest, by capitalising at 12% the annual value of the 
right of enjoyment of the property subject to the interest over the life expectancy of the 
person entitled to that interest, or such lesser period for which he will be entitled to that 
interest. 
The comments made above on section 62(2) and the determination of the annual value 
in the section on valuing fiduciary, usufructory or like interests are equally applicable to 
the annual value in this instance. 
 
4.4.5 Capital Gains Tax on donating a bare dominium 
The same principles as set forth in 4.4.2 of this chapter will find application.  The 
market value of the bare dominium will be valued in terms of paragraph 31 of the 
Eighth Schedule: 
“31.Market value.—(1) the market value of - 
….(e) any asset which is subject to a fiduciary, usufructuary or other similar 
interest in favour of any person, the amount by which the market value of the full 
ownership of that asset exceeds the value of that fiduciary, usufructuary or other 
like interest determined in accordance with item (d)” 
4.4.6 Estate Duty on donating a bare dominium 
As discussed in 4.4.3 above, the implications to both the donor and donee from an estate 
planning point of view will need to be considered when making a donation of a limited 
interest.  Specific examples which consider this impact are examined in chapter seven. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the various tax implications on the creation of limited real 
rights.  The following “stages” of creation have been considered: 
• Creation at the bequest of testator 
• Creation on sale by the seller 
• Creation on donation by the donor. 
Chapters five and six will move on to a consideration of the tax implications on the 
cessation during lifetime of limited real rights and at time of death for limited real rights 
holders. 
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CHAPTER 5: LIMITED INTEREST CEASING DURING LIFETIME 
5.1 CGT implications of ceasing of limited real right 
The most likely situation of the ceasing of a limited real right during lifetime will be 
where a usufruct has been granted for a specific period of time, and such period of time 
has expired.  In terms of paragraph 11(1), a “disposal is any event…which results in the 
creation….or extinction of an asset…”.  Paragraph 11(1)(b) also includes the 
“termination” or “expiry” of an asset.  The usufruct will expire or terminate at the end 
of the period for which it has been granted, and there will therefore be a disposal of the 
usufruct. 
 
The holder of the usufructuary will receive no proceeds on disposal.  This will result in 
a capital loss.  In terms of paragraph 15(1)(c), this capital loss is to be disregarded to the 
extent that the asset is used for purposes other than carrying on a trade.46 
 
There is the possibility that the disposal may be to a connected person.  Paragraph 38 of 
the Eighth Schedule will then apply and deem the disposal to be at an amount received 
equal to the market value of the asset disposed of at that date of disposal.47    
 
Per the CGT Guide48 a usufruct has a market value of nil on the date of expiry.  The 
usufruct is terminated at this time49 and there can be no value to this right once 
terminated. 
                                                 
46 Note that paragraph 15(1)(c) must be read with paragraph 53(3)(f). 
47 Paragraph 38(1)(a) of the Eighth Schedule. 
48 Page 500 in the John Brown example 
49 Refer to 2.3.3 for a discussion on the termination of servitudes 
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The disposal of a usufruct to a connected person (for example if the connected person 
was the bare dominium holder) will therefore have the same consequences as disposal 
to a non-connected person. 
 
In terms of the person acquiring the asset, the base cost will be nil in either of the two 
scenarios discussed above.  Should the acquirer be the bare dominium holder, the base 
cost of the bare dominium is not affected by the expiry of the usufruct. 
 
In this regard, the CGT Guide makes the following comment:50 
“Some commentators have suggested that the bare dominium holder should be granted 
an uplift in base cost as a result of the enhancement in value caused by the expiry of the 
usufruct.  There is no substance in this argument. At the date of acquisition the bare 
dominium was worth the ‘low’ value placed on it because of the encumbrance of the 
usufruct. Furthermore the enhanced value was obtained for no additional 
consideration. The bare dominium holder never disposed of the future right of use 
pertaining to the period after expiry of the usufruct in the first place, and cannot 
therefore be said to have reacquired it. While the usufructuary may have had a disposal 
by expiry of the usufruct, it is not a disposal that can give rise to a corresponding 
acquisition in the hands of the bare dominium holder. When a usufruct ends it simply 
ceases to exist and is incapable of being transmitted to another person. Not all 
disposals give rise to corresponding acquisitions. For example, the scrapping of an 
asset does not give rise to an acquisition and the expiry of a usufruct is no different.” 
 
                                                 
50 Page 500 in the John Brown example 
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5.2 Estate duty implications of ceasing of a limited right 
There are no direct Estate duty implications to the ceasing of a limited real right, but the 
use of a limited real right which ceases during the lifetime of a person can be used 
within an estate planning strategy.  This is discussed in further detail in chapter seven, 
in the example which discusses the sale of the bare dominium with retention of the 
usufruct.51 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
The direct tax consequences of the cessation of a limited real right would appear to have 
an immediate CGT impact only.  However, as will be shown in chapter seven, the use of 
a usufruct for a limited period time of time can be an effective tax planning tool which 
impacts both estate duty and transfer duty. 
 
The following chapter examines the tax implications to the final “stage” of limited real 
rights considered in this treatise, the limited real right held at death. 
                                                 
51 Refer to 7.10 
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CHAPTER 6: LIMITED INTERESTS HELD AT THE TIME OF DEATH 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This is the final chapter on the application (to particular “stages” of limited real rights) 
of the framework of legislation identified in chapter three of this treatise.   
 
6.2 Estate Duty Act implications on the death of a limited real right holder 
 
6.2.1 Fiduciary, usufructuary or other like interest 
 
A usufruct52 must be valued in terms of section 5(1)(b) of the Estate Duty Act  which 
states: 
“….in the case of any such fiduciary, usufructuary or other like interest in 
property as is referred to in paragraph (a) of section 3 (2), an amount 
determined by capitalizing at twelve per cent the annual value of the right of 
enjoyment of the property in which the deceased held any such fiduciary, 
usufructuary or other like interest, to the extent to which the person who upon 
the cessation of the said interest of the deceased in consequence of the death of 
the deceased becomes entitled to any right of enjoyment of such property of 
whatever nature, over the expectation of life of such person, or if such right of 
enjoyment is to be held for a lesser period than the life of such person, over such 
lesser period:  
                                                 
52 Note that “usufructuary” or “usufruct” is used in this chapter as meaning “fiduciary, usufructuary or 
other like interest” unless otherwise indicated. 
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Proviso one (author has added heading) 
Provided that in any case in which it is proved to the satisfaction of the 
Commissioner that such person paid any consideration for the right of 
ownership in the property whereby he became entitled to the right of enjoyment 
of the property upon the death of the deceased, the value shall be so much of the 
value so arrived at as exceeds the amount of such consideration together with 
interest thereon calculated at six per cent per annum from the date of payment of 
such consideration to the date of death of the deceased:  
Proviso two (author has added heading) 
Provided further that where upon the cessation of the interest of the deceased in 
any property, there accrues to the holder of the bare dominium therein, the full 
ownership in that property, the value of the advantage or benefit so accruing by 
reason of the cessation of the interest held by the deceased, shall not exceed the 
difference between the fair market value of that property as at the date of such 
cessation and the value of the bare dominium as at the date when such bare 
dominium was first acquired under the disposition creating the said interest held 
by the deceased:  
Proviso three (author has added heading)  
Provided further that if upon the cessation of the interest held by the deceased it 
is not possible to ascertain until some future date the person or some or all of 
the persons who will become entitled to the right of enjoyment of the property, 
the value shall be determined by capitalizing at twelve per cent over a period of 
fifty years the annual value of the right of enjoyment of the property in which 
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such interest was held, unless the Commissioner and the executor agree that, 
having regard to the circumstances of the case, it would be reasonable to adopt 
a lesser period than fifty years, in which event such lesser period, as agreed, 
may be adopted accordingly 
 
The approach to valuing the fiduciary, usufruct or like interest is dependant on the facts.  
There is one method of valuation that will apply should the usufruct pass to another 
usufructuary before reverting to the bare dominium holder and another method should 
the usufruct revert directly to the bare dominium holder on the death of the 
usufructuary. 
 
If the usufruct passes to another usufructuary then the value of the usufruct is equal to 
the annual yield discounted at 12% annually over the shorter of the life expectancy of 
the succeeding usufructuary or the fixed period. 
 
In terms of the second proviso to section 5(1)(b) of the Estate Duty Act, if the usufruct 
accrues to the bare dominium holder, a more complicated formula is applied. The value 
of the usufruct is equal to the annual yield discounted at 12% annually over the life 
expectancy of the bare dominium holder, but such usufruct is to be limited in value to 
the fair market value at the last usufructuary’s death less the value of the bare dominium 
at the date it was first acquired. 
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The following example illustrates the workings of this second proviso:53 
 
Example - the second proviso to section 5(1)(b)
In year 1, A donated the usufruct on a farm with a fair market value of R1 000 000
to B and the bare dominium to C.  At that date, B was 60 years old.
In year 10, B dies and C gets full ownership of the farm, with a fair market value
 of R2 000 000. C's age is 40 years old at that date.
In B's estate the value of the usufruct is determined as follows:
1. Annual value of usufruct = R 2 000 000 X 12% 240 000             
2. Age next birthday of C = 41 years old
3. Life expectancy of C = 28.69 years
4. Present value of R1 received for 28.69 years = 8.01067
5. Value of usufruct = R240 000 X 8.01067 1 922 561          A
Limited by 2nd proviso to:
Fair market value 2 000 000          
Less: Value of bare dominium when first acquired 204 388             (note 1)
Amount included in B's estate 1 795 612          B
 
Notes 
1. The value of the usufruct in year 1 was: R1 000 000 X 12% X 6.63010 (based on 
B’s age next birthday of 61 years old) = R795 612.  Therefore the value of the 
bare dominium in year 1 was the fair market value of the property in year 1, less 
the value of the usufruct in year 1; R1 000 000 – R795 612 = R204 388. 
2. Therefore the value of the usufruct at B’s death is the lesser of A or B above. 
R1 795 612 will therefore be included in B’s estate. 
 
 
                                                 
53 This example is reproduced from Huxam, page 551 
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6.2.2 Bare dominium  
The valuation for estate duty purposes is derived simply by subtracting from the asset’s 
fair market value, at date of death, the usufruct’s value based on the shorter of the life 
expectancy of the current usufructuary or the fixed period, if applicable.54 
 
6.2.3 Fiduciary rights 
The valuation procedures are identical to those which apply to the valuation of 
usufructs, except that there is no bare dominium to value. This is because the 
fideicommissary has no rights of ownership for the duration of the fiduciary right.55 
 
6.3 CGT implications on the death of a limited real right holder 
In terms of paragraph 40(1) a deceased person must be treated as having disposed of his 
assets to his deceased estate for proceeds equal to their market value on the date of his 
death.  
Generally, the deceased will make a capital gain or a capital loss of an amount equal to 
the difference between the market value of all his assets that are on hand on the date of 
his death and their base cost to him, with the exception of assets in paragraph 40(1)(a)-
(d). 
In terms of paragraph 40(1) the deceased estate is treated as having acquired the assets 
from the deceased at a cost equal to market value, which cost must be treated as an 
amount of expenditure actually incurred and paid for the purposes of paragraph 
20(1)(a). 
                                                 
54 Section 5(1)(f).  Note: this is valued in the same manner as for donations tax. 
55 Refer to chapter two for more detail on the legal nature of the fideicommissum. 
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In terms of paragraph 40(2), where an asset is disposed of by a deceased estate to an 
heir or legatee, the deceased estate is treated as having disposed of the asset for 
proceeds equal to the base cost in respect of that asset and the heir or legatee must be 
treated as having acquired that asset at a cost equal to the base cost of the deceased 
estate in respect of that asset.  This cost is treated as an amount of expenditure actually 
incurred and paid for the purpose of paragraph 20(1)(a). 
 
6.3.1 Usufruct 
Chapter two of this treatise has examined the legal nature of the usufruct, and in 
particular when the usufruct will expire.  The usufruct expires, inter alia, on cessation of 
the limited period for which it was granted or on the death of the usufructuary.  The 
CGT Guide explains that the market value of the usufruct on expiry is nil.56  This will 
mean that there is a deemed disposal to the deceased estate at proceeds of nil.  This will 
result in a capital loss to the deceased.  As discussed in chapter five, in terms of 
paragraph 15(c), this capital loss is to be disregarded to the extent that the asset is used 
for purposes other than carrying on a trade. 
The deceased estate will be deemed to acquire the asset at nil value.  It is submitted that 
there can be no disposal in terms of paragraph 40(2) of an asset to the heir or legatee as 
the usufruct no longer exists.  As discussed in chapter five, should the bare dominium 
holder become the full owner on expiry of the usufruct, there can be no impact on the 
base cost of the bare dominium. 
 
                                                 
56 CGT Guide at page 500 
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6.3.2 Bare Dominium 
Should the deceased have held a bare dominium at death, paragraph 31(1)(e) will apply, 
and the market value of the bare dominium will be the amount by which the market 
value of the full ownership of that asset exceeds the value of the fiduciary, usufructuary 
or like interest determined in accordance with the life expectancy of the person to whom 
the interest was granted, or if that right of enjoyment is to be held over a period less 
than the life of that person, over that lesser period. 
 
The deceased will then have a deemed disposal for proceeds at the market value so 
determined.  A capital gain will be included in his taxable income.  A capital loss will 
be excluded in terms of paragraph 15(c) unless the asset was used for the purpose of 
carrying on a trade. 
 
The deceased estate will be treated as having acquired the bare dominium at this market 
value and to then have distributed the asset to the heir or legatee at this market value.57 
 
The heir or legatee will be treated as having acquired the asset at a cost equal to the base 
cost of the deceased estate,58 in this instance, the market value. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
This treatise has now considered the tax implications, within the framework of the 
legislation identified in chapter three, of various of the “stages” of limited real rights. 
                                                 
57 Paragraph 40(2)(a). 
58 Paragraph 40(2)(b). 
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In the following chapter, these tax implications are considered in the context of various 
tax planning strategies. 
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CHAPTER 7: TAX PLANNING STRATEGIES 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter an analysis is made of some of the tax planning arrangements which 
make use of limited real rights.  This chapter builds on the “John Brown” example59 
used in chapter four and examines various tax planning arrangements and the financial 
implications thereof to the various parties to the proposed arrangements. 
 
In the analysis in this chapter two assumptions are made (where applicable): 
• that the full estate duty abatement of R3.5 million has been fully utilised on 
other assets in the estate and will not be available to set off any estate duty in the 
example under consideration 
• that the CGT annual exclusion of R15 000 or R120 000 (in the case of death in 
the year of assessment) has been fully utilised against other gains and will not be 
available to set off against any capital gain in the example under consideration. 
These assumptions allow the consideration of the direct cash flow implications of the 
arrangement only.  However, the tax planner will need to consider the impact of the 
estate duty abatement and capital gain exclusions very carefully in assessing the use of 
any of the following arrangements. 
 
It is also acknowledged that the age of the taxpayer plays a fundamentally important 
part in determining the cash flow implications to the arrangements which follow.  This 
                                                 
59 The “John Brown” example is based on the example used in the CGT Guide at page 500. 
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chapter builds on the “John Brown” example used in chapter four for the sake of 
consistency, and makes use of the ages in this example.  It is very clear that a range of 
different outcomes is possible with these arrangements depending on the ages of the 
various parties to the arrangement. 
 
7.2 Split donations 60 
The first of the tax planning strategies analysed is the split donation of full ownership in 
the asset into donation of the usufruct and donation of the bare dominium. This split 
donation is used as an alternative to donating the full ownership of the asset or allowing 
the asset to form part of the deceased estate.  The advantage to be gained in making use 
of the split donation is found in the method of valuation on donation of these limited 
rights. 
The formula for usufruct donation valuations is based on the shorter of the donor’s or 
the usufructuary’s life expectancy (or a shorter fixed period, if applicable). The shorter 
the time period used, the smaller the donation value of the usufruct.61 
For the valuation of the bare dominium the usufruct value is calculated on the 
usufructuary’s life time or the shorter fixed period, if applicable. This calculation 
always gives rise to a smaller donation value, the longer the time period to be used. 
                                                 
60 R King and B Victor, Law and Estate Planning Easiguide, 15.2.7 Donating a usufruct of an asset (or 
other limited right). 
61 Refer to chapter 6 for a detailed discussion on the donation tax implications on donation of limited 
interests. 
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Making use of these valuation principles allows the tax planner to substantially reduce 
the value on which donations tax is levied.  Further to this, the tax planner will be able 
to make use of this option to reduce Estate Duty tax. 
Applying these principles to the John Brown example discussed in chapter 4, and 
changing the facts to this example slightly: 
Assume that John Brown, age next birthday 80, has an option to either bequeath his 
holiday home to his daughter, age next birthday 54, or to arrange a split donation of the 
usufruct to his daughter and of the bare dominium to his granddaughter, age next 
birthday 24.  Assume further that the value of the holiday home will be R1 000 000 
either at death or at donation.  The base cost to John was R400 000. 
The application of the law to these facts is shown on the next page: 
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Example - Split donations
R
Estate Duty
Market value of property 1 000 000   
Estate Duty at 20% 200 000      1
Donations Tax
Value of Usufruct
(1 000 000 X 12% X 4.024) 482 928      A
(Note 1)
Value of bare dominium
Market value of property 1 000 000   
less value of usufruct
(1 000 000 X 12% X 7.74834) 929 801      
(Note 2)
Bare dominium 70 199        B
Total donation value
(=A+B) 553 127      
Donations tax at 20% 110 625      2
Saving 89 375      
(=1-2)  
Notes: 
1. The usufruct is valued over the life expectancy of John (the donor).62 
2. The usufruct value, when valuing the bare dominium, is determined using the 
life expectancy of the daughter (the usufructuary).63 
The tax planner in this instance will have been able to save John Brown R89 375.  By 
splitting the donation into the usufruct and the bare dominium, the total value on which 
donations tax is to be levied has decreased from the market value of R1 000 000 to 
                                                 
62 Section 62(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act 
63 Section 62(1)(c) of the Income Tax Acr 
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R553 127.  Assuming that John Brown has utilised the full donations tax exemption 
prior to making the donation, the same net saving of R89 375 would have ensued had a 
comparison been made between donating full ownership in the asset as opposed to a 
split donation. 
The split donation will be a disposal for CGT purposes.  To determine the base cost of 
the disposal of the limited interest will require the application of paragraph 33 of the 
Eighth schedule.   
The donor would also be entitled to add the donations tax payable to the base cost of the 
asset in accordance with paragraph 20(1)(c)(vii).  This paragraphs states that the 
donations tax to be added to the base cost is to be determined in accordance with 
paragraph 22. 
Paragraph 22 states that  the amount of the donations tax payable by a person in respect 
of the disposal of an asset which may be taken into account in terms of paragraph 
20 (1) (c) (vii) must be determined in accordance with the formula -  
  
where— 
(a) “Y” represents the amount to be determined; 
(b) “M” represents the market value of the asset donated in respect of which the 
donations tax is payable; 
(c) “A” represents all amounts allowed to be taken into account in determining 
the base cost of the asset in terms of this Part (other than 
paragraph 20 (1) (c) (vii)); and 
(d) “D” represents the total amount of donations tax so payable: 
Page 62 of 83 
Provided that where the amount included in “A” is greater than the amount included in 
“M”, the amount of donations tax to be taken into account in terms of 
paragraph 20 (1) (c) (vii) shall be nil. 
 
The CGT consequences of making a split donation, versus the CGT consequences of 
allowing the asset to fall into the deceased estate are examined in the example on the 
following page: 
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Example - Capital Gains Tax on split donation
Value of bare dominium R
Market value of property 1 000 000    
less value of usufruct 929 801       
(R1 000 000 X 12% X 7.74834)
(Note 1)
Bare Dominium 70 199         
The base cost is apportioned in terms of part disposal rule in paragraph 33.
Proceeds are equal to the market value of the limited interest 
in terms of paragraph 38.
Proceeds on bare dominium 70 199         
Base cost 36 504         
(R400 000 X R70 199/R1 000 000) + 28 080            
donation tax portion
((R70 199 - R28 080)/R70 199 X R14 040) 8 424              
(Note 2)
Capital Gain on disposal of bare dominium 33 696         
Proceeds on usufruct 929 801       
Base cost 429 872       
(R400 000 X R929 801/R1 000 000) + 371 920          
donation tax portion
(R929 801 - R371 920)/R929801 X R96 586 57 952            
(Note 3)
Capital Gain on disposal of usufruct 499 929       
Total Capital Gain 533 624       A
Capital Gains tax if asset falls into deceased estate
Market value = proceeds 1 000 000    
Base cost 400 000       
Capital Gain 600 000       B
(Note 4)
Net decrease in capital gain (= A-B) 66 376         
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Notes 
1. The usufruct is valued over the life expectancy of the daughter64 
2. Paragraph 22 states that  the amount of the donations tax payable by a person in 
respect of the disposal of an asset which may be taken into account in terms of 
paragraph 20 (1) (c) (vii) must be determined in accordance with the formula -  
  
See above for an explanation on this formula.  The donations tax used in the formula for 
the base cost of the bare dominium is the donations tax on the value of the bare 
dominium of R14 040 (R70 199 X 20%) 
3. As for point 2 above, the donations tax used in the formula for the base cost of the 
usufruct is the donations tax on the value of the usufruct of R96 586 (R482 928 X 20%). 
4. In terms of paragraph 40(1) a deceased person must be treated as having disposed of 
his assets to the deceased estate for proceeds equal to the market value on the date of his 
death. 
The split donation therefore results in a reduced capital gain on disposal of the asset 
when compared to the capital gains tax should the asset fall into the deceased estate.   
 
 
 
                                                 
64 Paragraph 31(1)(c) of the Eighth Schedule. 
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7.3 Replacing a donation to a natural person with a donation to a trust65 
John Brown can also elect to make the donation of the usufruct to a trust, with a 
donation of the bare dominium to the granddaughter. The impact of donating the 
usufruct to the trust is illustrated below: 
Market value of property 1 000 000        
Estate Duty at 20% 200 000           1
Donations Tax
Value of Usufruct
(1 000 000 X 12% X 4.024) 482 928           A
Value of bare dominium
Market value of property 1 000 000        
less value of usufruct
(1 000 000 X 12% X 8.3045) 996 540           
(Note 1)
Bare dominium 3 460               B
Total donation value
(=A+B) 486 388           
Donations tax at 20% 97 278             2
Saving 102 722         
(=1-2)
 
Notes 
1. The life expectancy of the trust is 50 years.66 
As can be seen from the example, the net saving has increased from R89 375 to 
R102 722.  This is due to the fact that the life expectancy of a trust is 50 years and a 
                                                 
65 King and Victor at 15.2.7.1 
66 Section 62(3) of the Income Tax Act 
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larger “present value of R1” can be used, thus increasing the value of the usufruct (for 
bare dominium valuation) and decreasing the value of the bare dominium. 
 
7.4 Donation of fiduciary right67 
It is possible for the tax planner to achieve increased savings for the donor by donation 
of a fiduciary right as opposed to the split donation of the usufruct and bare dominium.  
The reason for the additional saving is that the there is no bare dominium to be valued 
in the fiduciary arrangement.  This is illustrated in the example below: 
Example - Donation of fiduciary right
R
Estate Duty
Market value of property 1 000 000    
Estate Duty at 20% 200 000       1
Donations Tax
Value of fiduciary right (same as usufruct)
(1 000 000 X 12% X 4.024) 482 928       
Donations tax at 20% 96 586         2
Saving 103 414     
(=1-2)  
The use of the donation of the fiduciary right has achieved the same result intended by 
the donor who makes the split donation in the earlier example in this chapter, i.e. use of 
the property by the daughter until death at which time the full use of the property will 
succeed to the granddaughter, but, with an additional saving.  This is due to the fact that 
there is no bare dominium to be valued for donations tax. 
 
                                                 
67 King and Victor at 15.2.7.2 
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7.5 Negotiate a lower yield68 
In terms of section 62(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act, it is possible to approach the 
Commissioner and request that an annual yield of less than 12% be applied to a 
particular asset.  
 
The impact of negotiating such a lower yield will depend on which form of donation is 
decided upon by the tax planner.  Should the split donation be followed, the impact of 
the lower yield will be to decrease the value of the usufruct and increase the value of the 
bare dominium.  If a fiduciary right is to be donated, the right will be valued at a lower 
value with lower yields.  A request for a lower yield is therefore indicated where the 
donor intends donating a fiduciary right. 
 
7.6 Multiple usufructs69 
The tax planner may make additional savings by inserting a second usufruct between 
the first usufructuary and the ultimate successor to the usufruct (the bare dominium 
holder).   
For example, John Brown, age 80 next birthday, donates a lifelong usufruct over his 
holiday home (assume market value R1 000 000 at donation and death) to his daughter, 
age 54 next birthday, following which the usufruct accrues to his granddaughter for 10 
years, before accruing to an inter vivos trust which is the bare dominium holder.  A 
comparison of the impact to the daughter’s estate between having and not having this 
                                                 
68 King and Victor at 15.2.7.3. 
69 DM Davis, C Beneke and RD Jooste Estate Planning paragraph 12.3. 
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additional usufructuary is illustrated below: (Note, assume that the daughter dies the day 
after succeeding to the usufruct). 
Example - Multiple usufructs
R
Daughter's estate duty without additional usufruct
Value of usufruct 996 540   
(R1 000 000 X 12% X 8.3045)
Estate Duty at 20% 199 308   1
Note
The life expectancy used is 50 years, as usufruct succeeds to the trust
Daughter's estate duty with additional usufruct
Value of usufruct 667 802   
(R1 000 000 X 12% X 5.56502)
Estate Duty at 20% 133 560   2
Note
The life expectancy used is 10 years, being the period for which 
the additional usufructuary will hold the usufruct.
Saving 65 748     
(=1-2)
 
Inserting the additional usufruct with a limited time period results in a tax saving to the 
daughter’s deceased estate of R65 748.  The insertion of the additional usufructuary is 
of no direct benefit to the original donor, John Brown, in this example.  This 
arrangement will presumably be used when a wider view is taken towards wealth 
preservation. 
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Davis, Beneke and Jooste 70 discuss several similar schemes with reference to two 
cases, Basset v CIR71 and SBI v Jordaan.72 
 
The facts of the Basset v CIR73 case were that under a trust deed executed by his father 
the deceased had been entitled during his lifetime to the income from a trust fund.  The 
trust deed provided further (in clause 1(c)) that on the death of the deceased the income 
would be distributed to the children (in this instance there was only one child), until the 
children reached the age of thirty, at which time the capital of the fund would be 
distributed to the children (per clause 1(d)). 
 
In assessing the value of the interest held by the deceased the Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue capitalised its annual value over the expectation of life of the deceased’s minor 
son.  The taxpayer argued that at the age of 30 years the beneficiary was entitled to the 
capital sum of the trust fund and the usufructuary interest acquired by him would then 
cease and was consequently to be regarded as for a lesser period than his expectation of 
life (i.e. the period from date of death of deceased until age 30). 
 
The court held against Revenue, on the following basis:74 
“The fact that no specific limit to the period during which he is to be the recipient of the 
income is stated in clause 1(c) is not the end of the story. Clause 1(d) does not give him 
the bare dominium in the capital of the trust. Because he is the only child he is entitled, 
                                                 
70 DM Davis, C Beneke and RD Jooste Estate Planning paragraph 12.3 
71 1961 (4) SA 770 (D), 24 SATC 412 
72 1967 (3) SA 329 (A), 29 SATC 81 
73 Ibid 
74 Per Werner AJ in Basset v CIR 1961 (4) SA 770 (D), 24 SATC 412 at page 415 
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on reaching the age of 30, to receive from the trustees the capital of the trust. 
Thereafter the trust has no capital in which he can have ‘a usufructuary or other like 
interest’, and , therefore, the interest given to him in terms of clause 1(c) must cease 
when he reaches the age of 30 years. It is true that thereafter he has all the income 
which the assets which previously represented the capital of the trust may bring in, but 
he then receives it qua owner of these assets, and not as a person holding a 
‘usufructuary or other like interest’ in those assets.” 
 
The Basset case therefore provides authority for the use of multiple usufructs as a tax 
planning tool in the manner explained in the example above.  This is also consistent 
with the principle set forth in chapter 2, at 2.3.3, which states that where the holder of 
the personal servitude becomes owner of the servient tenement, the servitude 
terminates. 
 
Davis, Beneke and Jooste consider a possible counter-argument to the Basset case to be 
that the Basset case is incompatible with the SBI v Jordaan75 case, which is an Appellate 
Division case and which must therefore prevail.  A discussion of the facts of this case is 
not deemed necessary in the context of this analysis.  The key finding of the SBI v 
Jordaan76 case that is discussed by these authors is essentially that it is the ultimate 
beneficiary’s life expectancy that must be used when valuing the usufruct.  This would 
seem to contradict the finding in the Basset case. 
 
                                                 
75 Ibid 
76 Ibid 
Page 71 of 83 
However, Davis, Beneke and Jooste state that the Basset case was not raised in the 
Jordaan case and that an attempt to overturn the reasoning in the Basset case using the 
Jordaan reasoning is unlikely to succeed. 
 
7.7 Use of Estate Duty Act section 5(1)(b) proviso  
 
Fiduciary and usufructuary interests are valued for Estate Duty in terms of section 
5(1)(b).  Section 5(1)(b) contains three provisos which operate should certain conditions 
be met.  The second of these provisos states that if, on the death of the deceased, the 
bare dominium holder obtains full ownership of the property, then the value of the 
usufruct accruing for Estate Duty purposes cannot exceed the fair market value of the 
property at the date of the deceased’s death less the value of the bare dominium when 
the bare dominium was first acquired.  This proviso will only apply when the bare 
dominium was acquired under the same disposition which created the usufruct. 
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Using the John Brown examples as per 7.2 to illustrate the effect of this proviso: 
Example of 2nd proviso to section 5(1)(b)
Assumed additional facts R
In year 10 (after the split donation), the daughter dies and 
the granddaughter gets full ownership of the holiday home 
with a market value of R2 000 000 at that date.
The granddaughter is now 34 years old.
Estate Duty Value for daughter
Value of usufruct 1 978 822  A
(R2 000 000 X 12% X 8.24509)
(note 1)
Note 1:
Valued on present value factor of granddaughter age next birthday of 35
limited by 2nd proviso
Fair market value 2 000 000  
less value of bared dominium when first acquired 517 072     
(note 2)
Amount included in daughters estate 1 482 928  B
Gross saving (=A-B) 495 894     
Estate duty saving (at 20%) 99 179       
Note 2
The value of the usufruct in year 1 was 482 928     
(refer 7.2 example above)
Value of bare dominium 517 072     
Market value in year one 1 000 000  
less usufruct in year one 482 928     
 
This position can be compared to the position of the donation made in the example in 
7.4 above, when the fiduciary now dies: 
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Example - Estate duty on death of fiduciary holder
Assume the same facts as for the example above, i.e that the 
daughter has now died 10 years from the date of original donation.
Estate Duty value for daughter
Value of fiduciary interest 1 978 822  
(R2 000 000 X 12% X 8.24509)
Estate Duty at 20% 395 764     
Estate Duty if had used split donation 296 586     
(per example in 10.7 above)
Difference 99 179      
 
A net saving to the daughter’s Estate Duty tax is made of R99 179 should the split 
donation option be used as opposed to the fiduciary donation.  The net incremental 
saving discussed earlier in this chapter between the split donation and the donation of a 
fiduciary right amounted to R14 039 (R103 414 – R89 375).  This saving was to the 
donor.  However, the analysis in these earlier examples did not consider the impact to 
the donee.  Should a broader tax planning view be taken, that takes into account not 
only tax savings to the client, but to his/her future family, then the split donation should 
have been used, as the net saving to John Brown and to his daughter provides a net 
advantage (saving) of  R85 140 (R99 179 less R14 039). 
 
7.8 Right of use – the primary residence77 
Another common arrangement is for the testator to bequeath the house to a child or trust 
subject to the surviving spouse’s right of occupation of the house for the rest of his/her 
life.  
                                                 
77 Davis, Beneke and Jooste at 12.2. 
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The value of the right of use will be deductible for estate duty purposes when the 
testator dies in terms of section 4(q) of the Estate Duty Act.  The right of use has been 
left to his spouse and there is a roll-over in respect of that asset in terms of paragraph 
40(1)(a) read with paragraph 67(2)(a) of the Eighth Schedule. 78 
 
When the surviving spouse dies, the right of use will be property in his/her estate for 
estate duty purposes.  The right of use will be valued in terms of section 5(1)(b) of the 
Estate Duty Act, and will be subject to the three provisos therein.  Of note in this 
instance, is the second proviso which has been discussed in 7.7 above.  On the death of 
the deceased, the bare dominium holder receives full ownership of the property, and the 
value of the usufruct is thus limited per the discussion in 7.7.  The value to be included 
will at the very least be less than full ownership, and at best will be less than the “full” 
value of the usufruct, being limited by the operation of the second proviso.  
 
In terms of paragraph 40(1) a deceased person must be treated as having disposed of 
his/her assets to his/her deceased estate for proceeds equal to their market value on the 
date of his/her death.  There will therefore be a deemed disposal of the right of use to 
the deceased estate at the market value of this right of use.  The usufruct expires on the 
death of the surviving spouse and the market value on this date of expiry is nil.79  The 
base cost of the right of use will have been the rolled over base cost determined when 
the full ownership was split into bare dominium and the right of use on the date of death 
                                                 
78 Refer to the example in chapter four. 
79 CGT Guide, page 500. 
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of the predeceased spouse.  The ensuing capital loss cannot be claimed in this instance 
as the property is not used for the carrying on of trade.80 
 
Should the bare dominium be bequeathed to the trust as opposed to the child, the CGT 
implications to the surviving spouse on death are the same as those discussed above.  
However, for estate duty purposes, the right of use will be valued over a period of 50 
years81 instead of over the period of the child’s life expectancy.  It must be remembered 
though that the second proviso to section 5(1)(b) may well find application in this 
instance.82 
 
7.9 Retention of the usufruct and sale of the bare dominium83 
The final planning arrangement analysed is where the bare dominium in an asset is sold 
to a trust, while the usufruct therein is retained. 
                                                 
80 Paragraph 15(c) read with paragraph 53(3)(f) 
81 Section 5(3) of the Estate Duty Act. 
82 Refer to paragraph 10.7 of this chapter 
83 Davis, Beneke and Jooste at 12.5 
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Example - Retention of the usufruct and sale of the bare dominium
John Brown, age 80, sells at market value the bare dominium in his holiday
home to his family trust on an interest free loan account.
The usufruct in the holiday home is retained by him for a period of 10 years.
The base cost of the property in John's hands is R400 000 and the 
market value at the date of sale is R1 000 000.
Result
John
The property is allocated between its component parts as follows: R
Market Value 1 000 000   
Usufruct 678 024      
(R1 000 000 X 12% X Present value of R1 for 10 years)
Bare Dominium 321 976      
Proceeds are equal to market value of the Bare Dominium 321 976      
The base cost is apportioned in terms of the part disposal rule in para 33
Base cost 128 790      
(R400 000 X 321 976/1 000 000)
Capital gain 193 186      
John will be entitled to the annual capital gains exclusion of R15 000.
The base cost of the usufruct is the remaining base cost of the R400 000.
Original base cost 400 000      
Bare dominium disposed 128 790      
Base cost of usufruct 271 210      
 
Should John pass away within the 10 year period of the usufruct: 
CGT implications: 
In terms of paragraph 40(1) of the Eighth Schedule a deceased person must be treated as 
having disposed of his/her assets to his/her deceased estate for proceeds equal to their 
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market value on the date of his/her death.  There will therefore be a deemed disposal of 
the right of use to the deceased estate at the market value of this right of use.  The 
usufruct expires on John's death and the market value on this date of expiry is nil.84   
The base cost of the right of use will have been the rolled over base cost determined 
when the full ownership was split into bare dominium and the right of use on the date of 
death of the predeceased spouse.  The ensuing capital loss cannot be claimed in this 
instance as the property is not used for the carrying on of trade.85 
 
Estate Duty implications: 
A usufruct must be valued in terms of section 5(1)(b) of the Estate Duty Act which 
requires that the usufruct be valued over the over the expectation of life of the person to 
whom the right of enjoyment passes, or if such right of enjoyment is to be held for a 
lesser period than the life of such person, over such lesser period.  In this instance, the 
right of enjoyment was to be held for 10 years.  The life expectancy used for the trust 
would be 50 years.  The lesser period of 10 years would therefore be used.  The 
implication of the use of the lesser period is that the value to be included in the deceased 
estate of John would decrease over the ten year period, and would ultimately attract no 
Estate Duty. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
84 CGT Guide, page 500 
85 Paragraph 15(c) read with paragraph 53(3)(f) 
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Should John live for the 10 years: 
The same CGT consequences would apply as for when John dies within the 10 year 
period.  There will be no estate duty levied as the usufruct will have expired and full 
ownership will have vested in the trust. 
 
Other taxes: 
John has disposed of the bare dominium to the trust at market value and there is 
therefore no donations tax implication. 
 
Implications to the trust: 
The base cost in the hands of the trust is R128 790, the market value paid at the date of 
disposal by John.  The trust will have paid transfer duty on this value only, another 
advantage of the plan.  Should the trust subsequently dispose of the holiday home, the 
base cost will be R128 790.  There is no adjustment to the base cost on the expiry of the 
usufruct.  Assuming that the intention is to hold the holiday home indefinitely, this will 
not pose any problems.  Should the sale of the holiday home, out of the trust, be 
anticipated, then the low base cost and subsequently increased capital gain should be 
taken into consideration by the planner. 
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7.10 General Anti – Avoidance Rule (“GAAR”) 
The “new” general anti-avoidance rules are incorporated in twelve new sections (80A to 
80L) which came into effect for schemes or arrangements entered into on or after 
2 November 2006. 
 
A decision to make use of a tax plan that makes use of a limited real right will need to 
consider the possible application by SARS of GAAR to the plan.   
 
The GAAR opens by describing what an “impermissible avoidance arrangement” is in 
section 80A. The powers that the Commissioner has with respect to an impermissible 
avoidance arrangement are set out in section 80B. The remaining provisions expand on 
these first two provisions and deal with certain procedural issues that arise. 86 
 
The requirements for an impermissible avoidance arrangement may be summarised very 
briefly as follows.87  
Arrangement 
+ Tax Effect 
Avoidance Arrangement 
+ Sole or Main Purpose Tax Avoidance 
+ Tainted Element 
Impermissible Tax Avoidance 
 
                                                 
86 Explanatory memorandum of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 2006 at 62 
87 Ibid 
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Section 80A  
Per the Explanatory Memorandum of the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 2006: 
“This section provides that an avoidance arrangement (or an arrangement which 
results in a tax benefit) is an impermissible avoidance arrangement if:  
1. Its sole or main purpose was to obtain a tax benefit; and  
2. A tainted element is present. There are three tainted elements although their 
formulation may vary depending on the context in which an arrangement was 
carried out or entered into.  
2.1 Abnormality (sections 80A(a)(i), 80A(b) and 80(c)(i));  
2.2 Lack of commercial substance (section 80A(a)(ii)); or  
2.3 Misuse or abuse of the provisions of the Act (section 80A(c)(ii))” 
 
The abnormality element is largely based on the old section 103 of the Income Tax Act 
and is not discussed in further detail.  The lack of commercial substance element is not 
considered relevant in the context of the tax planning discussed in this treatise. Per the 
Explanatory Memorandum88  
“the misuse or abuse element has its inspiration in Canadian and certain 
European jurisdictions approaches to impermissible tax avoidance. The two new 
elements are intended both to remedy the well-recognised weaknesses in the 
current abnormality requirement and to expand the scope of the GAAR to 
address as many forms of impermissible tax avoidance as possible.” 
                                                 
88 Ibid at 63 
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In making a decision to make use of a limited real right/s in a tax planning strategy, the 
tax planner will need to consider the potentially “broader net” that the new GAAR casts 
when compared to the old GAAR in section 103. In particular, consideration must be 
given to the “tainted element” category, which includes as a class of “tainted element” 
the “misuse or abuse of provisions of the Act”.  This class would appear to have far 
reaching application, and any tax plan which makes use of a limited real right strategy 
will need to take cognisance of this fact. 
 
7.11 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered some of the existing tax planning strategies that make use 
of limited real rights, and the various tax implications thereof.  It is clear that the tax 
planner, when considering the use of a limited right/s in a tax plan, will need to consider 
the impact of the wide range of applicable legislation.  For example, it is not possible to 
simply consider that there may be a future estate duty saving without considering the 
immediate possible donations and/or CGT implications.  The same can be said for only 
considering the immediate CGT or donations tax implications without considering the 
future estate duty implications.  The life expectancy of the various parties to the planned 
arrangement will also need to be carefully considered.  There are various considerations 
which will need to be weighed up when deciding on which of the strategies to use, if at 
all.  This chapter has considered some of the tax and cash flow implications of a 
selection of the many possible strategies that may be made use of by the tax planner 
which make use of limited real rights. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this treatise was to provide an analysis of the tax implications of making use 
of limited real rights in tax planning. 
 
In order to understand the tax implications of making use of limited real rights it is 
necessary to understand the nature and legal form of these rights.  The nature and legal 
form of these rights was outlined in chapter 2.  A detailed analysis of the legal 
distinction between real and personal rights was considered to be outside the scope of 
this treatise.  The assumption made for the purposes of this treatise is that a real right is 
enforceable against the whole world, that is, against the owner of the property and all 
other persons who have legal claims to the property by virtue of a contract with the 
owner or because of the death or insolvency of the owner.  A personal right, on the 
other hand, merely gives the holder the right to claim from a particular person either that 
he delivers a thing, or performs or refrains from performing a certain act.89 The 
importance of this distinction lies in the determination of the tax legislation applicable 
to the right in question. 
 
The next step in working through an analysis of the tax implications of making use of 
limited real rights was therefore to define the scope of applicable legislation.  This 
required an analysis of the scoping provisions of our tax legislation.  Once the scope of 
applicable legislation had been defined in chapter 3, it was then possible to move onto 
                                                 
89 Refer to chapter 2 
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an analysis of the application of the legislation identified to the various “stages” of 
limited real rights in chapters 4 to 6.  The stages analysed were: 
• The creation of a limited real right at the bequest of a testator 
• The creation of a limited real right on the sale or purchase thereof 
• The creation of a limited real right on donation thereof 
• The cessation of a limited real right in the course of the lifetime of the holder 
thereof 
• Holding a limited real right at the time of death 
 
It is clear from this analysis that the tax implications of making use of limited real rights 
are spread fairly broadly across several different pieces of legislation, and need to be 
carefully and fully considered when making a decision to make use of limited real 
rights. 
 
Chapter seven then moved on to an analysis of some of the tax planning strategies 
which make use of limited real rights.  Analysis of these strategies indicates that it is 
possible to make fairly substantial cash flow savings when deciding to implement a 
particular strategy which makes use of limited real rights.  Use of these strategies is not 
without risk.  SARS may examine a particular strategy in terms of the “new” GAAR.  A 
successful application of the GAAR may be disastrous to the taxpayer, and the tax 
planner will need to have considered and advised on the possibility of such a challenge 
from SARS.  In addition, in some of the strategies, there are risks associated with the 
anticipated life expectancy of parties to the tax plan being shorter than anticipated. 
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The use of limited real rights in a tax planning strategy will require consideration of a 
myriad of factors.  This treatise has considered some of these factors, including some of 
the tax (and cash flow) implications of specific strategies.  The conclusion is that the use 
of limited real rights in tax planning can be effective and provide savings, but that the 
use of such a strategy requires, inter alia, a very careful consideration of the interaction 
and application of our tax legislation to the strategy. 
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